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NOTES AND COMMENTS

exactly as though they were being paid a weekly salary without regard
to an hourly rate.
The courts have consistently rejected Belo wage plans where no
hourly rate is specified or where*the fixed wage is changed without a
corresponding change in the hourly rate. Assume a plan that specified
no hourly rate, but merely guaranteed a fixed wage for sixty hours
work,37 and the employer testified at the trial of the case that neither he
nor the employees felt it necessary to specify any hourly rate since none
of the employees exceeded sixty hours of work per week. If a court
should hold such a contract invalid and yet hold the contract in Hartford
valid, it would in effect be saying that it was looking only to the technical form of the contract, and not to its substance, since in either situation the wages paid the employees would be the same. It is difficult to
believe that Congress in enacting section 7(e) intended such a result.
Although the "substantial number of workweeks" test so persistently
advocated by the Administrator has not survived judicial scrutiny, 38 it
is submitted that the overtime provisions of the FLSA are being circumvented by Belo-type contracts where the hours guaranteed are not
exceeded. If the "regular rate" set in these contracts is truly bona fide,
it is difficult to perceive how employers could afford to pay such high
wages for hours not spent on the job. Perhaps this is another reason
why the Administrator looks upon these contracts with a jaundiced eye.
J.

HALBERT CONOLY

JAMES

F. SMITH

Marriage-Annulment-Doctrine of Relation Back
In October 1952 a widow was entitled to benefits under the Social
Security Act' as the unremarried widow of a deceased wage earner.
These benefits were terminated because of her marriage inJune 1954.
In November she filed for annulment on the ground of fraud in that
the husband never intended to consummate the marriage. The husband
" See Sikes v. Williams Lumber Co., 123 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. La. 1954), where
the district court rejected a purported Belo contract which provided $75.00 for
fifty-three hours work, with no regular rate stated in the contract. The court
said that since no hourly rate was specified in the agreement, the rate alleged by
the defendant was fictitious.
"Although there have been no revisions of the Administrator's Interpretative
Bulletins published since the Hartford and Feinberg decisions, the public is
currently being advised on request that the "substantial number of workweeks"
test is no longer the sole criterion in adjudging the validity of a particular Belotype contract, but may be given weight in determining the bona fide nature of
the contract. Interview with Pauline W. Horton, North Carolina Federal Representative for the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division of the United
States Department of Labor, February 13, 1958. This position has some support
in the language of the court in the Adams case. See notes 23-26 mcpra.
249
STAT. 623 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1952).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

defaulted and the court issued a decree of annulment in December 1954.
After the decree of annulment the widow requested reinstatement of
her benefits. Her application for reinstatement was denied by the
Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance, Social Security Administration. After exhausting her administrative remedies, she commenced this action for review of the administrative decision. The district court held that her benefits should be reinstated 2 and the court of
appeals affirmed.3 The appellate court's decision turned on the legal
effect given to an annulment under California law and on the meaning
of the word "remarriage." In California the legal effect of an annulment is that no valid marriage ever existed, even though the marriage
is only voidable. 4 The court looked to workmen's compensation casesu
and applied the meaning there given to the word remarriage, vi,., a
valid and subsisting marriage and not a void or voidable marriage.
From the standpoint of legal theory, it would appear that if a subsequent marriage is void the doctrine of relation back should always
apply (in the absence of a statute) ; but, if the subsequent marriage is
only voidable, the doctrine of relation back should not apply as such
marriages are deemed valid until avoided. 6 'Nevertheless, there are
cases within the same jurisdiction holding that the doctrine does apply
7
and cases holding that it does not apply where the marriage is voidable.
Some courts make it clear that whether or not they will apply the doctrine will depend upon whether it effects a result which conforms to the
sanctions of sound policy and justice as between the parties, their property rights, and the rights of their offspring. 8 Other courts seem to
reach the same conclusion without expressly indicating that their decision is based upon the equities of the situation rather than upon strict
legal theory. 9
'Pearsall v. Folsom, 138 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
'Folsom v. Pearsall, 245 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1957).
'Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (1917); Goff v. Goff, 52 Cal.
App. 2d 23, 125 P.2d 848 (1942).
'Eureka Block Coal Co. v. Wells, 83 Ind. App. 181, 147 N.E. 811 (1925);
First Nat'l Bank v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 68 N.W.2d
661 (N.D. 1955); Southern Ry. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498
(1939) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 54 Ariz. 1, 91 P.2d 700 (1939)
(dictum).
6
MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMESTic RELATIONS 9 (1931).
' Price v. Price, 24 Cal. App. 2d 462, 75 P.2d 655 (1938) (does not apply);
Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (1917) (does apply); Williams v.

State, 175 Misc. 972, 25 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Ct. Cl. 1941) (does not apply) ; Sleicher

v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929) (does apply).
' Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955).
'People ex rel. Byrnes v. Retirement Bd. of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit
Fund, 272 Ill. App. 59 (1933) ; Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637

(1948); Huntington Hospital Ass'n v. Halaby, 204 Misc. 745, 124 N.Y.S.2d 791

(County Ct. 1953); National City Bank v. Lowenstein, 197 Misc. 707, 99
N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Zuckerman v. Zuckerman, 66 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup.

Ct 1946), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 814, 66 N.Y.S2d 410 (1st Dep't 1946).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

19581

The question of whether an annulment decree has the effect of rendering a voidable marriage void from the beginning often arises in those
cases where a separation agreement or an alimony decree calls for
payments to terminate upon remarriage. In these cases relation back has
sometimes been applied, thereby reinstating alimony payments when the
marriage was subsequently annulled. 1° But in New York a statute1 1
gives the wife the right to receive support from the husband of the
annulled marriage, thus removing the reason for reviving the obligation
of the first husband; and California has refused to apply the theory of
relation back to reinstate alimony payments on the ground that the
divorced husband after her remarriage has the right to recommit his
2

assets.1

The question of relation back also arises in cases where the question
is the validity of a second marriage entered into prior to the annulment
of the first marriage. In the North Carolina case of Taylor v. White, 13
where a first marriage was annulled on the ground of duress, the court
allowed the decree to relate back and declared the marriage void ab
initio, thereby making a second marriage entered into prior to the
annulment a valid marriage.' 4 The Taylor case illustrates the violence
done to other legal principles when the doctrine of relation back is
applied to a voidable marriage. One legal principle is that a voidable
marriage is valid until avoided;15 another is that a second marriage
entered into while a valid marriage exists is bigamous and absolutely
void. 16 Thus it would appear that the second marriage in Taylor was
absolutely void. Yet, it is made valid by the application of the doctrine
of relation back.
Although it may be desirable for the court to apply or refuse to apply
the doctrine of relation back depending upon the equities of the case,
"0Sutton v. Leib, 199 F2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952) (applying Illinois law) ; Bren-

holts v. Brenholts, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 309 (1935); Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y.

366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929). But see Linneman v. Linneman, 1 Ill. App. 2d 48, 116
N.E.2d 182 (1953) (alimony was not reinstated when wife got annulment in
California on grounds of impotency, since in Illinois impotency is not a ground for
annulment).
"IN.Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 1140-a, Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124
N.E.2d 290 (1954).
"2Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955). See also Price v.

'Price, 24 Cal. App. 2d 462, 75 P.2d 655 (1938).; In re Gosnell's Estate, 63 Cal.
App. 2d 38, 146 P.2d 42 (1944) (dictum).
"160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912).
"Marriages entered into through duress are voidable in North Carolina. The

only void marriages are interracial marriages and bigamous marriages. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 51-3 (Supp. 1957), State v. Parker, 106 N.C. 711, 11 S.E. 517 (1890).
" Scarboro v. Scarboro, 233 N.C. 449, 64 S.E.2d 422 (1951). There is language
in the Scarboro case which casts some doubt on whether or not Taylor v. White
is still the law in North Carolina, but it does not overrule Taylor v. White.
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-183 (1953). This sets out the crime of bigamy and
bigamous cohabitation. See also State v. Parker, 106 N.C. 711, 11 S.E. 517

(1890).
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this creates uncertainties and sometimes does violence to sound legal
theory. Some of the uncertainties might be avoided if the legislative
bodies drafting statutes involving remarriage and if the judges drafting
alimony decrees would spell out to a greater extent what is meant by
remarriage.
KARL N. HILL, JR.
Searches and Seizures-Description in Warrant-Limits of Curtilage
A recent North Carolina case has presented some unique problems
in the admissibility of evidence found in the process of an unreasonable
search and seizure.' 'Vithin the same yard were two buildings, some
thirty feet apart. The first building was a house, owned and occupied
by a third party. The second building was a former filling station,
rented from the third party and occupied by the defendant. A search
warrant was obtained for the house against the third party and another
for the filling station against the defendant. The affidavit described
the defendant's "dwelling, garage, filling station, barn and outhouses and
cars and premises .... ,,2 The officer searched the filling station.
While searching the house of the third party the sheriff discovered,
for the first time, that the defendant also rented a back porch room of
the house. Despite the fact that neither the owner of the robm nor the
defendant gave his consent, the officer searched the room under the
warrant for the house. The court excluded the evidence found in the
room because it was seized in the course of an unreasonable search.
The court reached this decision upon the grounds: (1) that as
between the third party and the defendant, the defendant had the right
to invoke the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure, (2) the warrant for the search of the house did not authorize a
search of the back porch room. Thus the decision of the court did not
turn upon the question of search within the curtilage. But the facts
of the case necessarily suggest this problem. The room was close
enough to be said to be in the defendant's curtilage, being within the
same yard and within thirty feet of his dwelling. There was a path
from the filling station to the room and it would appear that the room
was used by the defendant in connection with the filling station as a
habitation.3 That this problem presented itself to the minds of the
State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 98 S.E.2d 329 (1957).
Id. at 240, 98 S.E.2d at 331.
'Apparently the limits of the curtilage are set by two primary elements: the
use of the lands and buildings in connection with the dwelling for ordinary habitation and the proximity to the dwelling. State v. Lee, 120 Ore. 643, 253 Pac. 533
(1927). There is no longer any requirement that this area be enclosed by a wall
or fence, as was the case in England. Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 94
S.E. 168 (1917).
1
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